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WOMEN’S QUOTAS: MAKING THE CASE FOR CODIFYING




II. BARRIERS AND CATALYSTS FOR WOMEN’S POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
III. THE PROS AND CONS OF EMPLOYING QUOTAS
A. Quotas in the Legislative Branch
B. Quotas for Non-elective Positions in the Executive Branch
C. Quotas in the Judiciary Branch
IV. STATE-SPONSORED FEMINISM & THE EGYPTIAN CONUNDRUM




Half of the world’s population is women, yet far less than this
number is actually represented in the world’s governing institutions.1
In 2019, women represented a mere twenty-four percent in all houses
of parliament worldwide.2 According to the Inter Parliamentary Un-
ion, as of January 2019, the percentage of women represented in
parliament ranged from sixty-one percent in Rwanda—the world’s
highest percentage—to zero percent in Micronesia and Papua New
Guinea.3 At least 127 countries in the world have imposed some type
of quota system in various levels of government; meanwhile, the aver-
age level of representation for women in countries even with quotas
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1. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2018 8 (2018), http://
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT].
2. Id.
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still only hovers around 25.7 percent.4 While most countries are far
from achieving gender parity in parliament, as of February 2019, the
top ten countries with the most female participation in parliament
were, in order: Rwanda, Cuba, Bolivia, Mexico, Sweden, Grenada,
Namibia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and South Africa.5
Both liberal and conservative groups have historically converged
against affirmative efforts to increase the participation of women in
politics, whether through quotas or other means, albeit for different
reasons.6 In conservative and traditional societies, states and de-
fenders of tradition attempt to discourage the integration of women
in politics, arguing that it interferes with the roles of women in the
home and society’s traditional structure.7 Conservatives and tradi-
tionalists have argued that a woman cannot effectively represent
the needs of constituents and practice ‘dirty’ politics in what has
historically been a male-dominated world.8 Meanwhile, liberals in
various countries have largely hesitated to support policies that
impose mandatory schemes for the integration of women because it
promotes what liberals regard as a pernicious form of “positive dis-
crimination”: discrimination that favors women over men in what
critics say should be a society of equal citizenship that does not dis-
tinguish between its genders.9
But there are strong arguments in favor of affirmative policies
to integrate women into political structures. First, representative
democracies should reflect the makeup of their people. Women are
half of society and representative bodies should reflect that aspect
of a country’s diversity, along with others.10 And while the integration
of minorities, especially religious and ethnic, can be incorporated
into governmental participation through a variety of mechanisms such
as decentralization of governmental authority and the provision of
funds to sidelined governorates (the details of which are beyond the
scope of this Article), the integration of women, who do not enjoy mi-
noritarian status, cannot be so easily addressed. Rather, it requires
4. Gender Quotas Database, INT’L INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSIS-
TANCE, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-overview [http://per
ma.cc/FY5M-38MF] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
5. Women in National Parliaments, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Drude Dahlerup, Increasing Women’s Political Representation: New
Trends in Gender Quotas, in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 141, 142 (2005).
7. See Amal Sabbagh, The Arab States: Enhancing Women’s Political Participation,
in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 52, 55–56 (2005).
8. See Nadezhda Shvedova, Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament, in
WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 33, 44, 45 (2005).
9. Irene Tinker, Quotas for Women in Elected Legislatures: Do They Really Empower
Women?, 27 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 531, 533 (2004).
10. Id.
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different solutions precisely because it is cross-cutting, and impacts
the lives of half of a country’s population, throughout all of its districts
and from border to border.
Second, a representative system should ensure the integration
of women into politics precisely because women have distinct needs
and priorities in life. Their inclusion may lead to a desirable femi-
nist agenda that has not developed without women’s active partici-
pation.11 For decades, “difference” or “relational” feminist scholars
have argued that women, when in power, rule differently, judge dif-
ferently, and are observant to needs that a male-dominated society
often overlooks.12 Hillary Clinton, for example, has stated publicly
that, “It’s not that every woman would govern differently. . . but. . .
given the chance, many women would govern and lead differently,”
in reference to the strong leadership of female New Zealand Prime
Minister, Jacinda Adern, after the March 2019 terrorist attack.13
Third, the adoption of gender quotas disrupts political recruit-
ment by “redefining candidate quality.”14 Tiffany Barnes and Mirya
Holman argue in the Journal of Politics that “increasing women’s
access to office may work to change how both party leaders and po-
tential candidates perceive who is viewed as an acceptable leader.”15
Diverse men are even more poised to win elections in a system with
a “broader conceptualization of quality candidates and when parties
recruit candidates from beyond their traditional power networks.”16
Fourth—and this reason is especially relevant to many Arab
countries—law itself does not always treat men and women equally,
and women’s presence in parliamentary and legislative bodies may
correct that failing. Countries that employ religiously derived per-
sonal status laws, such as Egypt and Syria (the case studies in this
Article), apply laws differently depending on the gender of the person
in question.17 Personal status laws and some aspects of the penal
code assign different evidentiary requirements and punishments for
men and women.18 In other words, modern Arab legal codes (many
11. See id. at 534.
12. See SALLY JANE KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY
REALLY MATTER 3–8 (2012).
13. Fareed Zakaria, Zakaria to Clinton: How Would Female Leaders Differ?, CNN
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2019/04/12/hillary-clinton-women
-leadership-zakaria-intv-vpx.cnn [http://perma.cc/3NQY-XG2C].
14. Tiffany D. Barnes & Mirya R. Holman, Gender Quotas, Women’s Representation,
and Legislative Diversity, J. POL. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 8.
17. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings and the Construction of Gender in Arab
Societies, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 911, 951. In this piece, Abu-Odeh lays out the distinctions
found in just one (of many) areas of the law: honor killings.
18. Id.
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of which were originally derived from French provisions of the 1800s)
impose discrimination openly as part of the system, thus creating an
added hurdle that women must overcome, very rarely having an op-
portunity to do so unless they are able to operate from within the
system, which is why being integrated as part of the system is even
more necessary.19
To be sure, there are counterarguments. The imposition of quotas
in a society, even at all levels of political power, are by no means suffi-
cient to correct gender bias or outright misogyny either in law or in
high offices. Arab feminist organizations continue to highlight this, as
authoritarian regimes often impose them as an alternative to creating
genuine spaces for women (and men) to change their societies.20 In
other words, some “elites view quotas as a way to demonstrate some
sort of commitment to women without really intending to alter exist-
ing patterns of inequality. . . .”21 Grassroots work is necessary to
educate both populations and political leaders on the value of inclu-
sion in political structures.22 Additionally, quotas take time to reap
their fruit: research shows that coupled with high turnover of repre-
sentatives, “quotas will transform . . . process as parties are . . .
required to replenish the supply of women for their lists over time.”23
While initially, in order to conform with quotas, women with well-
known last names or from political families usually filled seats,24
studies show that “15 years after the adoption of quotas, parties
19. See id.
20. Nazra for Feminist Studies discussed their dissatisfaction with the 2019 Constitu-
tional amendments that imposed a quota of twenty-five percent women. The Constitutional
Amendments Do Not Establish A Democracy that Supports Women in Politics, NAZRA FOR
FEMINIST STUDIES (Mar. 7, 2019), https://nazra.org/en/2019/03/constitutional-amendments
-do-not-establish-democracy-supports-women-politics?fbclid =IwAR12VTcvZK7qp4lbZV
-6CZwE-4r0qIEIt805jEfEIv4U9f5kAFjcyYQsMvE [http://perma.cc/JF56-RZ4G] (“We must
regard women’s political participation as a core public issue in any democracy and not
only as a matter of numbers (an outlook which may be appropriate and necessary only
during certain periods to empower women). In the absence of democracy and lack of
democratic mechanisms that allow women to play a role in the public sphere like men,
exclusion of some women who disagree with the regime and rising violence against women
with the state not doing enough to fight it, it is impossible to regard raising women’s quotas
in and of itself as proper affirmative action. Affirmative action should not only raise
women’s quotas but should also allow women of different backgrounds and ideologies to
exercise their political rights and act as positive role models for other women and to
motivate them to fight the battles of public and political life.”).
21. Mona Lena Krook, Gender Quotas in Parliament: A Global View, AL-RAIDA,
Summer/Fall 2009, at 10. This issue of the magazine, produced by the Institute for
Women’s Studies in the Arab World, was entirely dedicated to women’s quotas in the
Arab world.
22. See Azza Karam & Joni Lovenduski, Women in Parliament: Making a Difference,
in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 187, 207–10 (2005).
23. Barnes & Holman, supra note 14, at 6 (emphasis added).
24. See id. at 21.
2020] WOMEN’S QUOTAS 561
view women as competitive politicians and sometimes recruit them
to compete at the top of [their] list[s].”25 Finally, countries with quotas
need to ensure that quotas are actually implemented. If there is no
compliance with the law, or repercussions for failing to adhere to
quotas, the entire system to integrate women becomes meaningless
and not taken seriously by political parties and actors.26
This Article argues for imposing formal quotas for women in
Syria and in Syrian politics. On the one hand, since the beginning
of Syria’s uprising in March 2011, the country has been the site of
massive human rights violations, war crimes, and destruction of
infrastructure in excess of $400 billion.27 On the other hand, this
very destruction suggests the possibility of new legal and structural
changes over the longer term, given that Syria cannot go back to what
it was before the uprising began. More specifically, along with a
politically negotiated transition process, the proposed UN-sponsored
process involving 150 Syrians of diverse professional and personal
backgrounds (politicians, legal experts, technocrats, and civil society
activists, as well as members from various ethnic, linguistic, and re-
ligious groups) may result in the drafting of a new, consensus-based
constitution. This Article argues that quotas should be codified in a
future Syrian constitution.
This Article is divided into five sections. The first section of the
Article recounts the history of women’s quotas in the international
arena, and what international legal frameworks have developed over
time to address this global issue. The second section of the Article
discusses barriers to women’s political integration, both informal
and structural. The third section explores the debate regarding the
imposition of quotas at all three levels of government: the legislative,
executive, and judiciary branches. The fourth section of the Article
draws lessons from Syria’s neighbor, Egypt, that is considered the
region’s political trendsetter and which also recently included a man-
datory women’s quota in the revised constitution. Finally, the Article
will discuss Syria’s own history with women’s political integration
as well as what has transpired over the last nine years of conflict, and
the challenges of bringing a significant number of Syrian women to
the table as political negotiators and future political actors.
25. Id. at 20, 21. It is important to note that these studies do rely on the assumption
that the political system is a democracy, and not an authoritarian system.
26. See Mark El-Makari, The Proposed Gender Quota in Lebanon: Legal Crisis of
Democratic Transformation?, AL-RAIDA, Fall/Summer 2009, at 49.
27. See Jomana Qaddour, Assad Needs the United States and Its Allies for Recon-
struction, THE WASH. INST. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy
-analysis/view/assad-needs-the-united-states-and-its-allies-for-reconstruction [http://per
ma.cc/7M5Z-KRV5].
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I. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
The international movement for suffrage did not successfully
yield results until 1893, when New Zealand became the first country
to allow women to vote in its parliamentary elections.28 Other coun-
tries followed suit not too long after, including Australia in 1902,
Finland in 1906, and Norway in 1913.29 But suffrage did not actually
trigger women’s participation in political life. It was not until after
World War II that efforts to address mass global inequalities, includ-
ing those between men and women, began to emerge.30 In 1947, the
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women was estab-
lished, its work mostly culminating into the drafting and adoption of
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, which entered into force in 1981.31
One hundred and eighty-nine countries have ratified it to date.32
CEDAW lays out an “international bill of rights for women” as
well as a plan of action that countries must undertake to ensure wom-
en’s enjoyment of those rights.33 The 30-article document covers three
different areas: civil rights and the legal status of women, human re-
productions, and the impact of cultural factors on gender relations.34
On the topic of political participation, CEDAW’s Article 7 articulates:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the political and public life of
the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal
terms with men, the right:
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be
eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies;
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy
and the implementation thereof and to hold public
28. Shvedova, supra note 8, at 34.
29. Kim Hjelmgaard, Voting Rights for Women: How Countries Stack Up, USA TODAY
(Feb. 5, 2018, 9:58 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/02/05/voting-rights
-women-how-countries-stack-up/306238002 [http://perma.cc/XK85-SXBL].
30. Brief History of the Commission on the Status of Women, U.N. WOMEN, http://
www.unwomen.org/en/csw/brief-history [http://perma.cc/4ZU3-G54P].
31. Id.; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
32. See Status of Treaties: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en [http://perma.cc
/B8BF-KMDD] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
33. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination: Overview of the
Convention, U.N. WOMEN, https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw [http://perma.cc
/4Q2X-DFCL].
34. CEDAW, supra note 31, art. 7.
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office and perform all public functions at all levels of
government;35
CEDAW makes clear its purpose to ensure equal participation
of women in political life: to have the right to vote, to be elected, and
to participate in formulation of government policy at all levels.36 Stop-
ping short of suggesting a quota, and leaving that as an open ques-
tion for each individual country, CEDAW remains significant in
articulating a standard of behavior for ratifying states with regard to
their treatment of women in politics.37 CEDAW is taken seriously even
by countries that outright violate it: violators (especially authoritar-
ian violators) explicitly go out of their way to register reservations
they refuse to comply with instead of arguing that such require-
ments do not exist.38 That being said, even democratic countries
have struggled to mesh their national legislation with CEDAW.
Following on CEDAW’s momentum, in 1995, the Fourth U.N.
Conference on Women in Beijing pushed for more concrete steps to
ensure women’s political representation by emphasizing the need to
include women in order to create a healthy political system.39 The
Platform for Action focused on the “inequality between men and
women in the sharing of power and decision-making at all levels”
and the “insufficient mechanisms at all levels to promote the ad-
vancement of women.”40 The Conference’s Mission Statement stated
clearly that the “success of the Platform for Action” would require
strong “commitment to equal rights, equal responsibilities and equal
opportunities and to the equal participation of women and men in
all national, regional and international bodies and policy-making
processes.”41 Further, the Global Framework highlighted that unfor-
tunately women represented “a mere 10 [percent] of all elected
legislators [worldwide] and in most national and international




38. See id. art. 28. This is especially an issue in Muslim-majority countries, that have
lodged reservations regarding a woman’s ability to pass on her nationality to her
children in the same way as men (art. 9) and the right to freedom of movement (art. 15,
¶ 4). In many of these countries, including Syria, women cannot change residency or
leave the country without permission of the husband. Further, legal recognition of child
marriages is permitted in violation of (art. 16, ¶ 2) because it is argued that such mar-
riages are valid if they are sanctioned by Islamic law.
39. See U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Platform for Action, at
annex I ¶13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (Sept. 1995).
40. Id. annex II, ¶44.
41. Id. annex I, ¶36.
564 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:557
underrepresented.”42 With the conclusion of Beijing Conference
came a reinvigorated international commitment to women’s political
inclusion.
Five years later, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 on
Women, Peace, and Security, was passed, this time focusing on
women’s participation in post-conflict state-building.43 Kofi Annan
stated then that, “Peace is inextricably linked to equality between
women and men . . . , maintaining and promoting peace and security
requires equal participation in decision-making.”44 The 1990s, which
saw a series of atrocities including in the Balkans and Rwanda, had
led to disproportionate and severe impact of war on females, triggering
international interest in creating mechanisms that both acknowl-
edge and prevent such happenings in the future.45 The resolution
called upon the Secretary General to implement a strategic plan of
action “calling for an increase in the participation of women at
decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes.”46
The resolution rests on four pillars: participation, protection, pre-
vention and relief and recovery, and it spurred the drafting of seven
additional U.N. resolutions regarding women and conflict.47 In an
effort to make U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 practically
meaningful, however, U.N. member states resorted to developing Na-
tional Action Plans for each country.48 As of January 2018, 72 coun-
tries had National Action Plans; many countries have taken these
national action plans and codified them into law, mandating quotas
and a certain number of appointment-based positions allocated for
women in order to meet goals of increasing women’s representa-
tion.49 The United States submitted its plan in 2011, and Syria and
Egypt have yet to submit National Action Plans.50
42. Id. annex II, ¶ 28.
43. See S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
44. Julie Ballington, Introduction, in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 23,
24 (2005).
45. Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-respon
sibility-to-protect.shtml [http://perma.cc/T6L4-GQ23] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
46. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 43, ¶ 2.
47. What is UNSCR 1325? An Explanation of the Landmark Resolution on Women,
Peace and Security, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, https://www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding
/about_UNSCR_1325 [http://perma.cc/YS62-8NPR]. The six resolutions are: S.C. Res.
1820 (June 19, 2008); S.C. Res. 1888 (Sept. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1889 (Oct. 5, 2009); S.C.
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II. BARRIERS AND CATALYSTS FOR WOMEN’S
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
There are various legal and non-legal barriers to women’s poli-
tical participation. The most pressing factors are outlined below.
While most factors hinder women’s political inclusion, some fac-
tors—such as civil wars—can expedite what would normally be an
incredibly lengthy route.
A country’s history can propel or retard its feminist movements
(as well as the overall fight for equality across society). In the case
of the Middle East, rights of suffrage as well as political participa-
tion have been closely intertwined with each country’s colonialist
past. Often times, the movement to empower women, as well as mi-
norities, was an integral part of the agenda of colonialist powers.51
The move, however, was rarely a philanthropic one. It was pursued
by colonial powers in an attempt to maintain some semblance of
control even after their physical departure through various ‘minority’
proxies.52 Over time, resentment against these power apparatuses
designed by colonialists began to manifest. Many locals believed
that the feminist movement was a remnant of “western thought,”
betraying “authentic culture.”53 This charge was made by both
religious opponents to feminism, as well as nationalist-leftists who
questioned the entire authenticity of the movement as belonging to
the culture of colonizers, not the colonized.54 The reversion of women’s
rights to pre-colonial-era-type freedoms became a way to showcase
women as symbols of a country’s original, “‘uncontaminated’ culture.”55
The result of this symbolization of women became a tool used to
quell the movement: women’s rights becomes subordinate to the
‘more important’ agenda of national liberation and class struggle, a
cause shared by both the religious right and the nationalist-left.56
Culture and religion are also important factors, again either
propelling or stifling women’s movements. Islamic societies have had
a complicated history with women’s rights. There is too much his-
tory to cover here; but it is important to note that in the aftermath of
colonization, in the struggle to re-establish a country’s independent
51. See Usama Makdisi, The Problem of Sectarianism in the Middle East in an Age
of Western Hegemony, in SECTARIANIZATION: MAPPING THE NEW POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE
EAST 23, 29 (Hashemi & Postel eds., 2017).
52. See Itamar Rabinovich, The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918–1945,
14 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 693, 693 (1979).
53. NADJE AL-ALI, SECULARISM, GENDER, AND THE STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE
EGYPTIAN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 58 (2004).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 54.
56. See id. at 61–62.
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identity, clear power struggles between secular dictatorships (often
closely tied to militaries) and religious factions emerged.57 And as sec-
ular dictatorships struggled to wrestle power away from religious
leaders and institutions, they sought desperate approval from the
international community.58 The international community in general
viewed Middle Eastern societies as ‘backward’, led by religious
zealots.59 In an effort to push back on this notion, they ushered in
rushed legal reforms, including women’s rights reforms, without
sufficient grassroots campaigns to compliment such reforms.60 This
ultimately culminated into top-down regulations by political elites.
Laws were even named after the secular authoritarians themselves
(or their wives) such as the ‘Jehan Sadat Laws’ or the ‘Suzanne
Mubarak Laws,’ creating personal ties between the laws and their
authoritarian, secular founders.61
In response, religious and conservative movements embraced a
different approach, one they argued was more authentic to the coun-
try’s history. Some prominent female conservative activists even re-
jected the label ‘feminist’ as being “anti-men” and “negating religion.”62
Some conservative religious movements, however, also adopted
women’s issues, promoting women’s public involvement and their
right to education and work.63 That being said, many conservatives
and traditionalists simply kept out of the debate on women’s place
within the family, considering those issues sufficiently addressed by
Islam.64 Other conservative groups saw female participation in
parliament as a direct threat to the values governing the relation-
ship between men and women.65 New generations of Muslim women
have since challenged the connection between religion and women’s
rights, arguing that no contradiction exists between UN-stipulated
standards and Islam, and pointing instead to pre-Islamic traditions
as the cause of women’s oppression.66
57. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate, 16
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145 (2004). Abu-Odeh explores this tension in great detail
throughout this piece.
58. See AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 73.
59. Id. at 72.
60. See id. at 74.
61. See id. at 51–85. The chapter discusses the evolution of the Egyptian women’s
movement and the role that each First Lady played in the imposition of various laws
impacting women.
62. Id. at 82.
63. See AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 81–82.
64. See id. at 81.
65. See Gihan Abou-Zeid, Introducing Quotas in Africa: Discourses in Egypt, in THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF QUOTAS: AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 46, 48 (2004), https://www.idea.int
/sites/default/files/publications/implementation-of-quotas-african-experiences.pdf.
66. AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 81.
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Socio-economic factors have also played a role in determining
women’s political movement. While culture can be hard to quantify,
there are helpful indicators for assessing socio-economic conditions
of women,67 including the ratio of women’s to men’s literacy rates,
women’s labor force participation, and the ratio of women to men
that have university education.68 When women lack sufficient access
to education, and choice of professions, and are in fact expected to
take on both professional jobs outside of the home while still main-
taining their domestic responsibilities, their ability to participate in
politics is terribly hindered.69 Further, accessing the funds necessary
to maintain sustain a political campaign becomes impossible with-
out what is often male support, keeping them reliant on patriarchal
systems. Razia Faiz, former parliamentarian from Bangladesh,
aptly described this phenomenon:
The two most overwhelming obstacles for women in entering par-
liament are lack of constituents and lack of financial resources.
Women move from their father’s home to their husband’s home . . .
They are like refugees. They have no base from which to develop
contacts with the people or to build knowledge and experience
about the issues. Furthermore, they have no money of their own;
the money belongs to their fathers, their husbands or their in-
laws. Given the rising cost of running an effective campaign, this
poses another serious hurdle for women in the developing world.70
Other factors may serve as a catalyst for increased women’s
participation. The aftermath of conflict can often lead to ‘fast-tracking’
reforms if they are accompanied with massive institutional and legal
(including constitutional) changes.71 Further, quotas often emerge
during democratic transitions, and “ . . . may be seen as a way to
establish [] legitimacy of [a] new political system . . . .”72 Rwanda,
the country with the highest number of women in parliament (over
sixty percent) is one such example.73 Following the aftermath of
brutal genocide and civil war, during which more than 800,000 were
killed, women had no more than eighteen percent of seats.74 Rwanda
is now the world’s leader in embracing female politicians.75 There
67. See Nadezhda Shvedova, Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament, in
WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 33, 40 (2005).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 41.
70. Id.
71. See Dahlerup, supra note 6, at 139, 143.
72. Krook, supra note 21, at 11.
73. Women in National Parliaments, supra note 3.
74. Dahlerup, supra note 6, at 154.
75. Id.
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are numerous reasons for this. The first is that a twelve-member
constitutional committee was formed, which included three women,
one of which was the sole representative of civil society.76 The
constitution they drafted enshrined a series of international conven-
tions and international human rights instruments, including
CEDAW.77 Most importantly, Article 10 in the Constitution man-
dates that women should have at least thirty percent representation
in all decision-making organs.78 This offers a variety of ways for
women to come into office: in the Senate, they are automatically
granted twenty-six seats; in the Chamber of Deputies, a mix of
proportional representation as well as twenty-four women-only
elections (only women can vote and only women can run) seats are
available.79 There are also open competitive seats that women have
won as well.80 Grassroots structures managed by the Ministry of
Gender and Women in Development at the administrative and local
level were created to address women’s concerns at the grassroots,
societal level.81 Thus, Rwandan women maximized the benefit of
using both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in order to ensure
representation in the legislative branch, executive branch, and civil
society.82 Their coordinated push at all three levels resulted in a
policy Article which made specific recommendations to the Constitu-
tional Committee to ensure a gender sensitive document; they then
worked on obtaining mass appeal from grassroots communities.83
International development support helped fund this campaign
throughout its duration as well.84 The example of Rwanda, although
imperfect with regard to general freedoms post-conflict, is nonethe-
less insightful for women in other post-conflict societies.
III. THE PROS AND CONS OF EMPLOYING QUOTAS
Even though most studies focus on the ‘electability’ of women
into parliaments, the need to incorporate women’s participation is
most definitely not limited to the legislative branch. Indeed, the
judicial and executive branch are just as important—if not more so
in some political structures—and also require the participation of
women to be democratic and reflective of societal desires. Thus,
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id.
78. RWANDA CONST., art. 10, ¶ 4 (Dec. 18, 2015).
79. Dahlerup, supra note 6, at 156.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 156–57.
82. Id. at 157–58.
83. Id. at 158.
84. Id. at 160.
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their integration is necessary in all three levels of government: the
legislative, executive, and in the judiciary.
A. Quotas in the Legislative Branch
Measures to increase the number of credible women in politics
are often focused on their inclusion in parliament. According to stud-
ies, a system that promotes a critical mass of at least thirty to thirty-
five percent women in parliament is necessary “in order to bring
substantive differences into decision making in terms of content and
priorities as well as style and working climate.”85 The thirty percent
was initially promoted in 1995 in Beijing, and has remained an agreed
upon target ever since.86 Evidence has shown that when there is no
quota, women are not included in significant numbers in parliamen-
tary systems.87 For example, Lebanon, a country perceived as socially
progressive compared to its Arab neighbors, has a quota system for
its religious denominations.88 However, it has no quotas for female
representation, and has managed to only produce six female parlia-
mentarians out of 128 in the latest round of elections.89 Previous
Lebanese parliaments do not bode more positively. Meanwhile, coun-
tries like Iraq with a mandatory twenty-five percent quota have in-
sured that one quarter of the 329 seats are filled by women, even
though genuine arguments can be made as to their efficacy and ability
to improve society and their women’s lives through their representa-
tion.90 Examining country experiences with women’s integration
reveals that with few exceptions, without quotas, women are rarely
reflected in significant numbers in parliament, even over time and
with efforts by civil society to mainstream their role in political life.
Studies have also shown, however, that it does not suffice to
simply have a thirty percent quota.91 Different electoral systems can
lend themselves to greater or lesser amounts of women’s participation.
Multiple studies have shown that a “party list” system that adopts
a proportional representation system is more advantageous for
85. Tinker, supra note 9, at 540–41.
86. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: 20 YEARS IN REVIEW 1
(2015), http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/WIP20Y-en.pdf [hereinafter INTER-PARLIA-
MENTARY UNION].
87. The exception to this is the experience of the Scandinavian countries that estab-
lished a strong civil society movement first which built momentum for women’s participa-
tion. Quotas became self-imposed incrementally by political parties as a result, and never
enshrined by law. Dahlerup, supra note 6, at 147.
88. Record Number of Women on the Ballot in Lebanon’s First Parliamentary Elections
Since 2009, U.N. WOMEN (May 23, 2018), http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018
/5/news-record-number-of-women-on-the-ballot-in-lebanon [http://perma.cc/99PX-S7W9].
89. Id.
90. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, supra note 86, at 8.
91. See Tinker, supra note 9, at 534.
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women.92 A “party list” system requires each party to submit candi-
date names in a list form, and each party is allowed to select a num-
ber of representatives to parliament that correlates to the percentage
of votes that a party won.93 Further, proportional representation
systems, where women are placed on electoral lists as one in every
three names (to meet a quota criteria of one third for example) also
ensures that women are included in every list, as well as selected from
every list, giving them a more realistic chance of serving in office.94
By contrast, when regulations do not impose a quota, women and
minorities are often placed at the bottom of a list because they are
less likely to be candidates of mass appeal.95 Thus, even if a party
obtains seats according to the proportion of votes they captured, the
top names on the list are selected, and candidates on the bottom—
often women and minorities—don’t make the cut.96 Proportional
representation list systems can manifest as multi-district countries
(such as Turkey) or a country that is one large, single district (such
as Israel).97 Fewer districts, but with more legislative seats, coupled
with a quota system, will bring in more people, each of whom yield
more power (making each representative a powerful actor), including
the women representatives.98
Although the most reliable way to ensure women’s representa-
tion has been to codify it through constitutional frameworks, some-
times amending a constitution is an insurmountable feat (which is
also why post-conflict scenarios, during which constitutions are being
redrafted, offer unique opportunities to reset standards). There are
however other ways through which countries have introduced quotas.
Some mandate that political parties are required to include thirty
percent women (a quota would be included in election laws).99 Other
countries have chosen not to mandate but instead offer significant
financial incentives for campaigns, including grants, and/or commer-
cial air time for parties that have adhered to quotas.100 In all cases,
the goal is to incentivize parties as much as possible to increase fe-
male candidates. And it follows that while the first few rounds after
the introduction of such measures may be difficult as women will
lack sufficient political experience (having been marginalized for far





97. See Tinker, supra note 9, at 534.
98. Richard E. Matland, Enhancing Women’s Participation: Legislative Recruitment
and Electoral Systems, in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 93, 107 (2005).
99. See Tinker, supra note 9, at 538.
100. Sabbagh, supra note 7, at 66.
2020] WOMEN’S QUOTAS 571
too long), future generations will find mentorship in older genera-
tions in addition to precedents of women running, ensuring that
female representation is strong and qualified.
B. Quotas for Non-elective Positions in the Executive Branch
While electing women into office remains an absolute priority,
women are also underrepresented in other non-elective branches of
government. According to statistics provided by the United Nations
in 2015, women are rarely represented in high executive level po-
sitions.101 For example, in 1995, there were only 12 female heads of
state; in 2018, that number had grown to only 17.102 Women as cabinet
ministers while in 1994 was at 6 percent, grew only to 18 percent
over 20 years (2018).103 Further, only 18 percent of appointment-based
ministerial positions were filled by women, and when they are, they
are largely portfolios concerning the family, humanitarian issues,
social welfare, and other stereotypically female-dominated areas.104
Their appointment as high-level civil servants, ambassadors, and cabi-
net members remains negligible. Very few countries have achieved
gender parity in their cabinets, although their efforts are notable
(Finland, Cabo Verde, Sweden, France and Liechtenstein).105
Most countries with quotas have some type of appointment
system, rather than electoral system, in order to meet or help meet
their formal or informal quotas.106 Often times women from well-
known families or the daughters, wives, and relatives of powerful men
come to power this way, reinforcing the political elite network fur-
ther.107 Although all governments utilize some type of appointment
method to fill certain roles, when female presence is predominantly
done through this method, it becomes problematic. In Egypt, for ex-
ample, and as discussed in more detail below, women are largely rep-
resented through positions granted to them by both former President
Anwar Sadat and President Hosni Mubarak.108 This places the women
so appointed in a very difficult position: they become co-opted by
powerful politicians (in this case, through what can be referred to as
101. U.N. STATISTICS DIVISION, Power and Decision-Making, in WORLD’S WOMEN 2015:
TRENDS AND STATISTICS (2015), https://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/chapter5/chapter5
.html [http://perma.cc/4MSA-HJA4].
102. Power and Decision-Making, supra note 101; see also GLOBAL GENDER GAP
REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
103. Power and Decision-Making, supra note 101; GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT, supra
note 1, at 8.
104. Power and Decision-Making, supra note 101.
105. Id.
106. Dahlerup, supra note 6, at 142.
107. Barnes & Holman, supra note 14, at 21.
108. A full discussion on this is available throughout AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 51–85.
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“state feminism”) and the systems that ‘gave them’ those positions.109
Dissenting from the opinion of the ‘hand that fed you’ (i.e., gave you
that position) becomes a near-impossibility.110 For this reason, coun-
tries that have female leadership only in the executive, appointed
positions, should be viewed with skepticism: it is simply not enough
and does not give women the space to formulate their own political
positions because they are constantly indebted to patriarchal, estab-
lished political systems. Further, the political appointment system
should employ a professional standard that is publicly applied to
all—men and women—along with a public confirmation process to
help streamline appointments that, especially but not exclusively in
autocratic systems, are done through nepotism and proximity to
ruling regimes.
C. Quotas in the Judiciary Branch
In many countries, more power is being transferred to the ju-
diciary, which is often perceived as a less polarized, politicized branch
of government.111 Conversely, most public policy issues themselves
are becoming judicialized: rape, discrimination, and abortion are in
many cases being passed off to the judiciary to interpret based on a
country’s constitution or laws.112
According to the United Nations, as of 2015, men outnumbered
women as magistrates and judges in more than fifty percent of the
world’s countries.113 Less than nineteen percent of supreme courts
worldwide are presided over by a woman.114 And because judiciaries
are generally based on hierarchy, the higher one goes up in the ju-
diciary, the fewer women there are.115 The legal profession espe-
cially is based on ‘gatekeepers’ and seniority; as a result, proposing
non-discrimination using already existing criteria and process for
judicial selection has yet to ensure fair representation.116
A nondiverse judiciary suffers from their lack of reflection of
their petitioners’ lives. There is some evidence—albeit weak and
inconclusive—that women decide differently on the bench.117 It is
109. Abou-Zeid, supra note 65, at 49.
110. Id.
111. KENNEY, supra note 12, at 3.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Power and Decision-Making, supra note 101.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. KENNEY, supra note 12, at 27.
117. Jesse Prinz, Sex on the Bench, Do Women and Men Have Different Moral Values?,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 18, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/experiments
-in-philosophy/201005/sex-the-bench-do-women-and-men-have-different-moral-values
[http://perma.cc/7H7B-7K9P].
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clear that simply adding more women on a bench does not automati-
cally correlate with a court that will more reliably find in favor for
women applicants, just as simply adding more women to the legisla-
ture does not immediately or automatically correlate with increased
odds of passage for feminist legislation.118 Nonetheless, it does matter
who decides cases in court: it matters that the court reflect the make
of a society’s citizens and their values. “Bringing a gender lens to
judging” may result from a judge’s experience, education, and his/her
personal reflection, as well as the hard work of gender-sensitive or-
ganizations that work to educate the public on how the law may
discriminate across society. It is critical that a court is conscious of
how a law might seriously harm the country’s women and girls; that
it interpret notions of ‘equal protection’ and ‘discrimination’ in light
of social changes, and that it question gendered stereotypes.119 In
1989, the U.S. based National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ)
surveyed female judges from across the United States that make up
its membership: three-fourths of them agreed that women judges
work to heighten sensitivity of other judges to the problem of gender
bias.120 Arab women speak of how informal judicial structures handle
their marriage and child custody battles with a gendered bias: in
some cases, a male judge asked only the male petitioner for his version
of events and grievances, not even meeting with the woman to hear
her version of the events.121 And even in the cases where women
judges rule no differently than men and are not feminists, their
presence on the bench has signalized normalization of “women’s
authority and power,” which is necessary for the mainstreaming of
women in any branch of government, including the judiciary.122
IV. STATE-SPONSORED FEMINISM & THE EGYPTIAN CONUNDRUM
Before delving into Syria’s history of women’s political integration,
it is helpful to first study the example of Egypt, a country revered
as the ‘trendsetter’ of the Arab world, both politically and socially.123
Egypt and Syria were also united as one country for a very brief
period of time under the United Arab Republic from 1958 to 1961,
118. KENNEY, supra note 12, at 15.
119. Id. at 15–16.
120. Id. at 6.
121. For the sake of the privacy of the women involved, the author will not share their
names.
122. KENNEY, supra note 12, at 9.
123. Ben Hubbard & Rick Gladstone, Arab Spring Countries Find Peace Is Harder
Than Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world
/middleeast/egypt-bloodshed-may-be-ill-omen-for-broader-region.html [http://perma.cc
/X48M-NCLE].
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and therefore share some historical moments.124 Finally, Egypt’s
most recent political turmoil, culminating in the 2011 revolution,
provides a parallel example in the region for those looking to com-
pare the development of the women’s political integration movement
over the last ten tumultuous years.125
While there is a centuries long history of women’s participation
in Egyptian politics, the reign of King Farouk, from 1936 to 1952, is
a good starting point to understand the contemporary relation of the
state to feminism, largely because of the role of civil society that de-
veloped under his rule. Immediately before and during King Farouk’s
authority, Egypt saw a variety of women’s civil society groups develop:
Huda Sha’rawi founded the Egyptian Feminist Union in 1923, Zaynab
al-Ghazali founded the Muslim Women’s Society in 1936, and Doria
Shafiq founded Daughters of the Nile Union in 1948.126 Although
clear tensions existed between these various (and very different)
women’s movements, both Islamist and nationalist-leftist leaning
organizations agreed on one thing: they repudiated western influ-
ence of their movement as “contamination” of “authentic” Egyptian
culture.127 Islamist movements stood against attempts to help
women “cross-over” to a man’s world, in what they believed were “ . . .
unnatural settings and unfair situations which denigrate them and
take away their integrity and dignity as women.”128 Both secular
and religious movements that sought to improve the lives of Egyp-
tian women needed to be traced back to their roots, and would need
to gain social legitimacy needed to be gauged for how “western” or
“indigenous” they were.129 General societal opinion was that the
western world would not be welcome to come and dictate terms of
women’s development, no matter how universal its proposed measures
may seem, having colonized and taken active part in the repression
of Egyptians.130 Meanwhile, tensions between the various Egyptian
movements focused on those which subscribed to civic forms of nation-
alism (where women share equal responsibility in nation-building)
124. Egypt and Syria Were Once Joined, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 1971), https://www.ny
times.com/1971/04/18/archives/egypt-and-syria-were-once-joined-merger-achieved-by-nas
ser-lasted.html [http://perma.cc/SY48-TYE7].
125. Sarah Childress, Timeline: What’s Happened Since Egypt’s Revolution?, FRONTLINE
(Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-whats-happened
-since-egypts-revolution [http://perma.cc/6G38-F339].
126. Rana Magdy, Egyptian Feminist Movement: A Brief History, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/egyptian-femi
nist-movement-brief-history [http://perma.cc/EHM7-VBPW].
127. AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 54.
128. Abu-Odeh, supra note 57, at 152.
129. AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 58.
130. See id.
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and cultural forms of nationalism (which views women as symbols
of a nation’s ‘uncontaminated’ culture) in a post-colonial state.131
It is under President Gamal Abdel Nasser that the state’s atti-
tude towards the integration of women in political power became as-
sociated with a wider policy of “state feminism,”132 although women’s
presence cannot be fairly and fully reduced to that vaguely pejora-
tive descriptive phrase. Nasser, considered to be the father of the
modern Egyptian nation state, was much more heavy-handed in his
approach to civil society: he co-opted it fully, women’s organizations
included.133 His method is largely described as patriarchal, and he
sought to enforce the notion that the state was ‘granting’ women
rights (everything one had was ‘given’ by the state, essentially).134
During his tenure, in 1956, equality under the constitution was ar-
ticulated for the first time: “All Egyptians are equal under the law
in public rights and duties, without discrimination due to sex, origin,
language, religion, or belief.”135 Labor laws guaranteed “state sector
jobs for ‘all holders of high school diplomas and college degrees ir-
respective of gender.’”136 Women were granted suffrage in 1956, and
Egypt saw its first two women candidates win seats in 1957.137
Nasser’s nationalist state-building project incorporated women as
necessary actors as he sought to redistribute, modernize, and de-
velop a new Egyptian system.138 But his reforms were limited to his
state building project and did not seek to change the plight of women
within the family or permit women to set their own agendas.139
This method of containing women’s rights agendas continued
under President Anwar Sadat, although due to Sadat’s more open
economic policies, provided increased room for women to pursue
economic ambitions.140 This controlled space, ‘gifted’ by ruling au-
thoritarians, meant that “women’s organizations became associated
with the authoritarian state structure that ensured that women’s
rights became part of a larger state-led development strategy, all
restricted by state authoritarianism.”141
Under Sadat, in 1976, Egypt shifted back to the multi-party sys-
tem that Nasser had done away with, and in 1977, a law was passed
131. See generally Abu-Odeh, supra note 17; see also AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 54.
132. AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 68.
133. Magdy, supra note 126.
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135. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Jan. 16, 1956, art. 31.
136. AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 68.
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to regulate the activity of political parties.142 In 1979, with the advent
of CEDAW and Sadat’s desire for international acceptance and
legitimacy, Egypt ratified the convention.143 It was also keen to im-
plement Article 4, which stipulated that signatories adopt “temporary
special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between
men and women,” including quotas.144 As we will see later exposed
in the motivations of the current President Abdelfattah Elsisi, scholars
attribute Sadat’s move as done for two primary reasons: to undercut
an Islamist opposition bloc, and to appease western donors that Sadat
was keen to impress, particularly the United States (during Sadat’s
time, the Arab-Israeli peace talks were happening simultaneously).145
The development of women’s rights during the Sadat period,
however, cannot be complete without mention of his wife, Jehan
Sadat. During Sadat’s rule, Jehan aggressively sought out opportu-
nities to play a role in Egypt’s society.146 She called for the creation
of women-focused non-governmental organizations and simulta-
neously lobbied for laws that were advantageous to women.147 Her
efforts culminated in the Personal Status Law of 1979, dubbed
‘Jehan’s Law’, which granted women legal rights in marriage, polyg-
amy, divorce and child custody, including her right to travel without
needing her husband’s permission and raising the legal age for mar-
riage from sixteen to eighteen.148 But the way this law was passed
was key: in an attempt to push back against the growing Islamist
movements, some of who obstructed the movement to increasing
rights, the law was established by presidential decree, along with the
law to place a women’s quota in the constitution.149 What this did,
however, was solidify the connection between the strong authoritar-
ian state and women’s rights, delegitimizing it in the eyes of some,
especially the conservative Islamic organizations, who saw this as
yet another example of state overreach done in an effort to appease
the West.150
142. Abou-Zeid, supra note 65, at 46.
143. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner, Ratification Status for Egypt, U.N. TREATY
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The introduction of quotas for women by Sadat in 1979 of 30
seats (out of a total 360 seats; approximately 8 percent of all seats)
did yield short-term tangible results.151 Sadat’s effort to diversify
was not just confined to women, however: each district had to vote
for two members in each electoral district, one farmer and one
worker; thirty of those zones required that at least one woman had
to be elected—thereby satisfying the thirty women quota.152 Quota
rules were such that women could compete for men’s seats, but the
men could not run for the seats allocated for women.153 Further, the
president could appoint up to ten people in parliament, including at
least two women.154 These new laws resulted in a record number of
thirty-five women in parliament in 1979, and thirty-six women in
the 1984 parliament.155 That being said, an evaluation of the tenure
of these women reveals that the women who made it into office did
not have any positive influence on the plight of Egyptian women:
they did not submit any draft laws (while the women who had served
in the previous parliament had submitted ten laws) nor did they raise
a substantial number of political issues.156 However, given their very
limited political experience as the first wave of women benefitting
from the quota system, and given the fact that they received inade-
quate support and parliamentary training, the reason for their lack
of positive contributions are numerous, and include the fact that
some of these women were also likely appointed not on merit but for
United States Can Do, Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission (Nov. 3, 2015) (statement of Dr. Shadi Hamid, Brookings
Institution), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Testimony-Human
-Rights-in-Egypt.pdf. Throughout Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, and now Elsisi’s rule, the
state has forged a special relationship with al-Azhar University, regarded as Sunni
Islam’s most prestigious university. Maged Atef, Al-Azhar and the President: Breaking
Down the Relationship, WASH. INST. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute
.org/fikraforum/view/al-azhar-and-the-president-breaking-down-the-relationship [http://
perma.cc/E69C-7W3N]. But even al-Azhar is carefully controlled: al-Azhar University
was allowed to continue issuing fatwas on a variety of topics that reinforced the state’s
monopoly over security and maintained its dominance over everything related to per-
sonal status laws. Id. Al-Azhar has even pushed back on the state if it crossed into the
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the Coptic community. Mai Shams El-Din, The Right to Marriage and Divorce for Egypt’s
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their relationships with the Sadat family as well as their member-
ship in the National Democratic Party.157
After the assassination of Sadat, and after Hosni Mubarak as-
sumed the post of presidency, in 1983, the electoral laws were changed
from constituency elections to list nominations; these same laws
simultaneously placed severe restrictions and barred independent
candidates.158 Due to complaints that this discriminated against in-
dependent candidates, the law was amended in both 1986 and again
1990, ultimately reverting the system back to majority electoral
system and banning the list system.159 The 1986 law also abolished
the female quota, citing gender inequality.160 The effect of this was
immediate: in the next parliamentary cycle women’s representation
dropped to 2.2 percent.161
The Shura Council, established in 1980,162 was the upper house
in parliament and designed to advise the president on law and po-
licy.163 It was governed by its own rules, which from the outset dic-
tated that while two-thirds would be elected, a third of the seats
would be appointed by the president.164 While the Shura Council never
included a women’s quota, both presidents Sadat and Mubarak ap-
pointed women in government (both notably encouraged by their
wives) to satisfy the seats they needed to fill.165 As a result, the num-
ber of women in the Shura Council increased from 3.3 percent in 1980
to eventually 100 percent of appointed seats in 1998.166
In 2000, Mubarak followed Nasser and Sadat’s tradition of “state
feminism” by establishing by decree a thirty-member body, the Na-
tional Council for Women (NCW), dedicated solely to addressing the
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-dark-ramming-theconstitutional-amendments-through [http://perma.cc/B3W6-MHND].
164. Abou-Zeid, supra note 65, at 47.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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issues and concerns of Egyptian women.167 Mubarak’s wife, Suzanne
Mubarak, was named its first president.168 Although NCW is heavily
associated with the ruling elite and regime, it has pushed for limited
change in Egypt’s personal status laws.169 Dubbed the “Suzanne
Mubarak Laws,” these changes offered women protections when she
initiates divorce (khul’u); issued a national plan for combating sexual
harassment and assault; and increased the age divorced women
have custody of children from nine to fifteen, at which age they must
go to the father.170 Because of Suzanne’s direct role in overseeing the
NCW, however, these laws would later be thrown out almost
immediately during the 2011 revolution, precisely because of the
laws’ close association with the regime and the National Democratic
Party.171 This ‘governmentalization of women’s rights’ was once
again a criticism lodged at laws that, because they were enforced
solely from the top-down with little grassroots coordination, and were
seen as another extension of the ruling elite.172 Mubarak’s tenure
ended with a reinstatement of gender quotas in 2010, when women
accounted for twelve percent of parliamentarians.173
The 2011 revolution, and the series of constitutions in 2012, 2014
and now the 2019 amendments, promise little assurance for mean-
ingful participation of Egypt’s women. In fact, in 2011, all quotas were
dropped for the 2012 elections.174 During those elections, Egyptian
women only seized two percent of the total 498 seats.175
The 2012 Constitution—in place only a little over a year under
former President Mohammed Morsi—technically enshrined the
equality of men and women as citizens.176 However, it also dealt
167. See AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 68; Sara Abdel Rahim & Erin Fracolli, Egypt’s
National Council for Women: A Substitute for Civil Society, THE TAHRIR INST. FOR MIDDLE
EAST POL’Y (July 15, 2016), https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/egypts-national-coun
cil-for-women-a-substitute-for-civil-society [http://perma.cc/TD7J-TWXB]. The author of
this Article has personally met with Maya Morsi, the current head of the NCW in Cairo,
Egypt, March 2018.
168. Rana Magdy, Egyptian Feminist Movement: A Brief History, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/egyptian-femi
nist-movement-brief-history [http://perma.cc/65YD-KPU4].
169. Id.
170. Controversy Over ‘Suzanne’s Laws’, AL-AHRAM (May 5, 2011), http://weekly.ah
ram.org.eg/Archive/2011/1046/eg14.htm [http://perma.cc/6DZB-YMQN].
171. See id.
172. Magdy, supra note 126.
173. Erin Fracolli, Women and Quotas in Egypt’s Parliament, THE TAHRIR INST. FOR
MIDDLE EAST POL’Y (Jan. 5, 2017), https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/women-and
-quotas-in-egypts-parliament [http://perma.cc/23LL-WXQE].
174. Id.
175. Laila El Baradei & Dina Wafa, Women in the Second Egyptian Parliament Post
the Arab Spring: Do They Think They Stand a Chance?, 14 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUDIES,
42, 45 (2013).
176. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 22 Dec. 2012, art. 10.
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with women almost exclusively in Article Ten, where it discussed
family as the basis of Egyptian society, with the state providing pro-
tection to bread-winning, divorced, and widowed women.177 This
particular article was actually derived from Nasser’s 1956 constitu-
tion, and not associated strictly with Islamists.178 The Morsi consti-
tution in Article Two went on to re-establish Shari’a as the main
source of legislation, this time extrapolating directly from the Sadat
constitution.179 In Article Four, Morsi’s constitution, reaffirmed that
al-Azhar would be consulted in matters related to Shari’a, and
guaranteed it public funding to carry out its activity.180 No mention
of women as active participants in political life was included. Obvi-
ously, these particular points regarding a women’s role, the place of
Shari’a, and the role of al-Azhar, came to be associated with the
Islamists; indeed, they were key advocacy points for them during
constitutional debates.181 What is abundantly clear however is that
these points were not historically only associated with Islamists, and
in fact were derived from regimes that claimed to fight against the
Muslim Brotherhood.182
The coup of the summer of 2013, and the subsequent rise of now
President Abdelfattah Elsisi, brought with it yet a new constitution
(2014) and the 2015 electoral laws.183 The 2014 constitution in theory
articulates several important articles for women’s rights: equality of
citizenship and enshrining the principles of democratic governance
“rooted in equality between men and women in all walks of life.”184 It
also guarantees citizenship for anyone born to an Egyptian father or
an Egyptian mother.185 It ensures women a role in decision-making
177. Id.
178. Kayla Sivak-Reid, Tracing a State and its Language from Province to Republic:
Translations of Modern Egypt’s Constitutions, CLASSICS HONORS PROJECTS 47 (2016),
https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com
/&httpsredir=1&article=1023&context=classics_honors [http://perma.cc/E8R3-M6MT].
179. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 22 Dec. 2012, art. 2.
180. Id. art 4.
181. See, e.g., HOLGER ALBRECHT, EGYPT’S 2012 CONSTITUTION: DEVIL IN THE DETAILS,
NOT IN RELIGION (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB139-Egypt’s
%202012%20Constitution.pdf.
182. See, e.g., Ellen McLarney, Women’s Rights in the Egyptian Constitution: (Neo)-
Liberalism’s Family Values, JADALIYYA (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.jadaliyya.com/De
tails/28666/Women%60s-Rights-in-the-Egyptian-Constitution-NeoLiberalism%60s-Fam
ily-Values [http://perma.cc/M455-TVN5].
183. Reza Sayah & Mohammed Tawfeeq, Egypt Passes a New Constitution, CNN
(Jan. 18, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/18/world/africa/egypt-constitution/index
.html [http://perma.cc/FSH7-SNKH].
184. The Constitutional Amendments Do Not Establish a Democracy That Supports
Women in Politics, NAZRA FOR FEMINIST STUDIES (Mar. 7, 2019), https://nazra.org/en
/2019/03/constitutional-amendments-do-not-establish-democracy-supports-women-poli
tics [http://perma.cc/P4LB-2RT7].
185. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 6.
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and it commits the state to achieving “equality between women and
men in all civil, political” rights and commits the state to taking
“necessary measures to ensure the appropriate representation of
women in the houses of [parliament in the manner] specified by
law.”186 Further, it grants women the right to hold public posts and
high management posts in the state, and to appointment in judicial
bodies and entities without discrimination.187 Finally, the state also
commits to protecting women from all forms of violence against
women188 and promises to create an Anti-Discrimination Commis-
sion, the latter of which has yet to be established.189 The electoral laws
of 2015 also created a quota, but one that relied on age-old measures
undertaken by previous Egyptian governments: the president can
appoint twenty-eight seats in parliament, and it is expected that he
would be appointing women in order to facilitate gender diversity in
parliament.190 This of course leads back to the same problem articu-
lated before: women who are brought in by state elites are expected
to toe the line of the state elites, only with a female face.
Today, a total of ninety women are serving in parliament out of
a total of 596 seats; with seventy-six being elected and fourteen
being appointed by the president.191 Of the total 32 ministers, there
are also currently eight women, up from five in 2013 when Presi-
dent Elsisi assumed power.192 While Elsisi does not hail from any
one political party, women he selects to serve in the cabinet and as
appointees are, at the very least, palatable to, if not fully supportive
of, the state and status quo.193
The new constitutional amendments of 2019, which passed by
88.8 percent when put to a national referendum, lumped together
a 25 percent women’s quota along with several problematic amend-
ments: extending term limits for the president from four to six years
and allowing Elsisi to run again, keeping him in power until 2030;
permitting presidential oversight as well as authority to appoint the
heads of various judicial bodies in what has been for decades a
relatively independent judiciary; expanding the role of the armed
186. Id. art. 11.
187. Id.
188. Id. The parliament has yet to pass laws on this.
189. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art.53.
190. OCED, WOMEN’S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN EGYPT: BARRIERS, OPPORTUNITIES
AND GENDER SENSITIVITY OF SELECT POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 12 (July 2018), https://www
.oced.org/mena/governance/womens-political-participation-in-egypt.pdf.
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forces as guardians of the “constitution and democracy”; and estab-
lishing a second chamber of parliament, with one-third of its mem-
bers appointed by the president, among other amendments.194 Prior
to the passing of the amendments, activists and non-governmental
organizations alike voiced concern about combining women’s political
participation—done with an intent to appease western donors—with
massive state consolidation of control.195 Once again, this would
stigmatize women’s rights with heavy-handed measures of state
control. Many of these same organizations remain in favor of a
quota ensuring women’s political participation, but they recognize
that meaningful participation takes sustained effort over time to
achieve and involves removing barriers discussed in section one of
this Article; further, it can only be achieved with emancipation of
society at large.196 It cannot be effective if women who fill the quotas
are only there to reinforce the status quo.197 As Latifa Zayyad so
adequately said: “[w]omen can never be liberated if the whole coun-
try is not liberated.”198 And the increased power now in the hands of
Elsisi that discourages—if not outright bans—activists, academics,
institutions, and non-governmental organizations that seek civil so-
ciety participation, democratization, and reforms in Egypt, will not
likely be in favor of opportunities to meaningfully emancipate Egypt’s
women any time soon.199
V. THE CHALLENGE OF ENSURING POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION FOR WOMEN IN SYRIA
Syria, a country riddled with coups, violent clashes over power,
and now an uprising that has continued since 2011, presents the
region with challenges similar, although not identical, to Egypt.
Further, the fact that the underlying reasons for Syria’s conflict can
194. TIMEP Brief: Draft Constitutional Amendments, THE TAHRIR INST. FOR MIDDLE
EAST POL’Y (Feb. 7, 2019), https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-draft-constitu-
tional-amendments [http://perma.cc/FWQ6-S468].
195. Telephone Interview with Hafsa Halawa, Independent Political and Development
Consultant, MENA/Horn of Africa (Mar. 14, 2019).
196. See The Constitutional Amendments Do Not Establish A Democracy that Supports
Women in Politics, NAZRA FOR FEMINIST STUD., https://nazra.org/en/2019/03/constitu
tional-amendments-do-not-establish-democracy-supports-women-politics?fbclid=IwAR1
2VTcvZK7qp4lbZV-6CZwE-4r0qIEIt805jEfEIv4U9f5kAFjcyYQsMvE [http://perma.cc
/P4LB-2RT7] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
197. See Krook, supra note 21, at 14.
198. AL-ALI, supra note 53, at 61.
199. For an overview of The Law Governing the Work of Associations and Other
Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work (commonly known as the NGO Law),
Law No. 70 of 2017, see Timep Brief: NGO Law (Nov. 14, 2018), https://timep.org/reports
-briefings/timep-brief-ngo-law [http://perma.cc/DFM3-NGG3].
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only truly end with severe political changes leaves open the possibility
that Syria may one day provide the country’s women with genuine
opportunities for fair political participation and integration.
Since Syria’s independence from the French in 1946, the coun-
try has seen twelve different constitutions (including modifications
of constitutions).200 In 1949, Syrian women obtained suffrage through
election laws introduced by the military regime of Husni al-Za’em.201
The election laws stipulated that women could vote so long as they
had at least an elementary school education and could vote in separate
polling centers; men were the only ones permitted to stand as candi-
dates so long as they were thirty years of age, were Syrian citizens for
at least ten years, and completed a fifth grade minimum education.202
In August 1949, Za’em was overthrown four months after seizing
power by Sami al-Hinnawi who launched another military coup and
assumed power.203 Al-Hinnawi called for elections for a Constitu-
tional Assembly in order to draft the 1950 constitution.204 No women
were elected to this Assembly, and thus none took part in the draft-
ing of the constitution.205 That being said, the 1950 Constitution,
referred to as the “Constitution of Independence”, is seen as the first
real democratic moment in Syria’s modern history.206 The constitu-
tion “granted broad powers to the prime minister. . . limited the
powers of the president. . . . [and] strengthened judicial authority,
as well as the state’s democratic institutions, by modernizing the
Supreme Constitutional Court.”207 Further, individual rights were
modeled on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.208 It
also defined a voting Syrian citizen as either a man or woman over
eighteen years of age and permitted both the right to run for parlia-
ment so long as they met the minimum requirements: thirty years
of age and a minimum of fifth-grade-level education.209 Technically
speaking, this constitution qualified Syria as the first country in the
region to allow women to run for office.210
200. Radwan Ziadeh, The History of the Syrian Constitution, SYRIAN STUD. ASS’N BULL.,
https://ojcs.siue.edu/ojs/index.php/ssa/article/view/3236/1263 [http://perma.cc/S7E4-QWTG]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
201. MUNA GHANEM ET AL., WOMEN AND THE PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY IN THE SYRIAN ARAB
REPUBLIC 13, 14 (2007).
202. Id. at 14.
203. The Charge in Iraq (Tenney) to the Department of State, OFF. OF THE HIST.
(Feb. 19, 1951), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v05/d267 [http://per
ma.cc/H8T6-GBV8].
204. Ziadeh, supra note 200.
205. See GHANEM ET AL., supra note 201, at 15.
206. Ziadeh, supra note 200.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. GHANEM ET AL., supra note 201, at 14.
210. See Ziadeh, supra note 200. Radwan Ziadeh argues that it was the first constitution
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Syria’s tumultuous history of military coups continued, and in
1953 another military coup led by General Adib al-Shishakli brought
forth yet another constitution that turned Syria into a presidential
system and terminated the position of prime minister.211 The consti-
tution also defined voting citizens as both men and women over
eighteen years of age, who were registered in the civil registration
records, and lowered the age of standing for elections to educated
twenty-five-year-olds.212 Although women could technically run in
the 1954 elections, none did, and thus none were elected.213
Women in Syria made a first-time appearance in political office
during the short lifespan of the United Arab Republic (UAR)—the
unification of Egypt and Syria—presided over by Gamal Abdel-Nasser
between the years of 1958 and 1961.214 The UAR utilized a constitu-
tion that had been developed in Egypt under the reign of Nasser and
that now extended into Syria by virtue the extension of the union.215
Additionally, a new Nation’s Assembly was convened, consisting of
600 members: 200 from Syria and 400 from Egypt.216 For the first
time ever, two women were appointed—not elected—in office: Jihan
al-Mosli and Widad Haroun.217 The short-lived experiment of the
United Arab Republic fell apart however, and along with it disap-
peared women’s political representation for the next few years.218
In 1962, there was a short reversion to the 1950 Constitution,
until the coup launched by the National Council for the Revolutionary
Command in March 1963.219 In June 1963, the Council was assigned
as the legislature (replacing the parliament) and a state of emer-
gency was imposed (ultimately lasting until April 2011).220 In April
to allow women the right to run; the UN report argues on the contrary however that the
text implied only men. Id.
211. See GHANEM ET AL., supra note 201, at 14.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 15 (Despite having no female candidates, the Syrian Communist Party does
state in its documents that women’s votes helped elect its candidate, Khaled Bagdash, to
parliament, indicating women’s active participation in the election process. Further, while
women did not run for a series of reasons discussed earlier in the Article (lack of financial
support, cultural, religious, etc.), the coup’s undemocratic military nature had a paralyzing
effect on the participation of both men and women’s participation in the elections.).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 18.
216. Id. at 15.
217. See GHANEM ET AL., supra note 201, at 15.
218. Id.
219. See Ziadeh, supra note 200 (The National Council for the Revolutionary Command
consisted of 12 members of the Ba’ath Party, and 8 independents and Nasserists (Arab
nationalists consistent with Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s ideology)); see also PATRICK SEALE,
ASAD OF SYRIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 78 (1989).
220. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syria’s Assad Ends State of Emergency, REUTERS (Apr. 20,
2011, 8:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria/syrias-assad-ends-state-of-emer
gency-idUSTRE72N2MC20110421 [http://perma.cc/TLS3-94PG].
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1964, the Council announced a temporary constitution.221 According
to Article 33 of this constitution, “the Revolutionary National As-
sembly shall be formed from its current members (appointed), in addi-
tion to representatives from the people whose number and method
of representation shall be determined by a law.”222 From this came
the appointment of the first iteration of the Revolutionary National
Council, and in September 1965, eight women were appointed out
of ninety-five members, and on February 2, 1966, the Council was
expanded to 134 members, with four new women being added to
make a total of twelve women.223 The Assembly was incredibly short
lived however, and was unable to hold any meetings as it was dis-
solved by late February due to major power struggles.224
Several years of political instability ensued in Syria until lieu-
tenant general Hafez al-Assad seized power in November 1970.225
The People’s Assembly was established in 1970; its primary task was
to draft a constitution.226 Four women were appointed to the People’s
Assembly.227 In 1973, a new constitution was ratified (that remained
in place until the 2012 amendments).228 The 1973 constitution held
that the Ba’ath Party was the leading party in the state and that the
National Council for Revolutionary Command was the only entity
permitted to nominate the president.229 However, the same constitu-
tion also pledged in Article 25 that, “citizens are equal before the law
in their rights and duties. . . .[and] [t]he state insures the principle
of equal opportunities for citizens.”230 Further, Article 45, entitled
Women, stated that, “The state guarantees women all opportunities
enabling them to fully and effectively participate in the political,
social, cultural, and economic life. The state removes the restrictions
that prevent women’s development and participation in building the
socialist Arab society.”231 Despite these guarantees found in the con-
stitution, however, the emergency law in place since 1963 “eclipsed
many of the legal protections offered by the constitution.”232
221. Ziadeh, supra note 200.
222. See GHANEM ET AL., supra note 201, at 15.
223. Id. at 15–16.
224. Id. at 16.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 20.
227. Id.
228. GHANEM ET AL., supra note 201, at 13.
229. It remained in force until 2012, when modifications were made to the constitu-
tion. CONSTITUTION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, 13 Mar. 1973, art 8.
230. Id. art. 25.
231. Id. art. 45.
232. SANJA KELLY & JULIA BRESLIN, WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA: PROGRESS AMID RESISTANCE 4 (2010), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files
/inline_images/Syria.pdf.
586 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:557
The first term of People’s Assembly began on June 9, 1973, and
thereafter elections were held every four years.233 The June 1973
Assembly was the first assembly to elect Syrian women into office;
4 women served that term, and the number steadily grew over time:
6 out of a total of 195 representatives in 1977; 13 out of a total of
195 in 1981; 16 out of a total of 195 in 1986; 21 out of a total of 250
in 1990; 24 out of a total of 250 in 1994; 26 out of a total of 250 in
1998; 31 out of a total of 250 in 2003; 31 out of a total of 250 seats
in 2007; 30 out of a total of 250 in 2011, as well as 31 out of 250 in
2015.234 Prominent Syrian feminists argue that despite the rise in
number of women, that did not amount to a rise in feminists, or
more attention to a woman’s agenda.235 Women, like the men, were
by and large prominent women in the Ba’athist Party and promoted
a Ba’athist agenda.236
During the Hafiz years, like in the Nasser years in Egypt, civil
society was almost completely co-opted by the ruling Ba’ath Party;
all other movements, even apolitical women’s movements, were
banned.237 Women’s organizations were expected to be listed under
the government-funded General Women’s Union (GWU), which the
government claimed represented all Syrian women; groups that did
not join were closely affiliated with the regime regardless.238 A select
few that evaded registration, such as the Syrian Women’s League,
operated discreetly and were constantly susceptible to closures and
its leadership was constantly in danger of being arrested; attracting
members and funding was an ongoing issue, given their precarious
situation with the authorities.239
Women’s organizations during the Hafiz era largely focused on
skills and empowerment trainings along with panel discussions on
233. See GHANEM ET AL., supra note 201, at 21.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 39.
236. Interview with Sabah al-Hallak, Board member of The Syrian Women’s League
and member of the U.N. Women’s Advisory Board, in Saint Julian’s, Malta (May 11,
2019) [hereinafter Interview with Sabah al-Hallak].
237. See Lama Rajeh, My Journey with Al-Qubaysiat Sisterhood, ENGLISH AL-
JUMHURIYA (June 22, 2017), https://www.aljumhuriya.net/en/content/my-journey-al-quba
ysiat-sisterhood [http://perma.cc/XT8Q-VNWC] (This Article does not delve into the
subject of the Qubaysiyat, a female-only apolitical religious movement that focuses on
religious education for women, banned by the Syrian government since its inception in
the 1960s until 2003, when they were permitted to exist legally and are largely perceived
as friendly to the government).
238. PEACEBUILDING DEFINES OUR FUTURE NOW: A STUDY OF WOMEN’S PEACE ACTI-
VISM IN SYRIA 8 (2015), https://badael.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Peacebuilding
_Syria_20Jan.pdf [hereinafter PEACEBUILDING DEFINES OUR FUTURE NOW].
239. Kelly & Breslin, supra note 232, at 6 (The GWU, established by the government,
has been flagged as problematic by Freedom House in its ratings of freedom in Syria
because of its claim to represent all Syrian women and that receives state funding, elimi-
nating the need for other groups to exist).
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women’s issues, including to a very minor extent equality and legal
reforms.240 By the late 1980s, the work of women’s organizations “re-
sulted in the defection of women’s organizations from male-domi-
nated political parties” as they slowly began more openly advocating
for the rights of working class and rural women.241
It is important to note that, similar to Egypt, Hafiz was not
opposed to the mere presence of women in government: in fact, the
participation of Ba’athist women was seen as necessary to reflect a
secular, modern Syria—a primary goal of Assad’s—that was meant
to contrast sharply with the image of the Muslim Brotherhood,
which he identified as terrorists, justifying his brutal attack of them
in Hama in 1982.242 Thus, ‘secular’ looking women were welcomed in
Assad’s Syria: only women without hijab (headscarf) were allowed to
run for office, serve in any delegations, or as ambassadors.243 Despite
this guise of modernity and secularism, their presence still remained
largely confined to traditional female roles, as they served in posi-
tions related to culture, higher education, social affairs, and labor.244
The 1990s, and the Fourth World Conference on Women in
Beijing, facilitated an unprecedented moment for Syrian women’s
organizations to critique state policies and make suggestions for re-
form, particularly in areas that concerned violence against women.245
They began to build momentum around issues enshrined in CEDAW.
In 2003, Syria ratified the Convention, although with various re-
strictions that the CEDAW Committee expressed concern over.246
240. PEACEBUILDING DEFINES OUR FUTURE NOW, supra note 238, at 8.
241. Id.
242. See Suleiman al-Khalidi, Survivors of Syria’s Hama Massacre Watch and Hope,
REUTERS (July 7, 2011, 1:51 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-hama-idUS
TRE7665R620110707 [http://perma.cc/HLL4-TXDN].
243. Interview with Sabah al-Hallak, supra note 236 (There was technically no law
that prohibited veiled women from running for elections, but it was understood as an
expectation that no veiled women could hold office. Further, schools in Syria did not
permit students through high school to wear the hijab for decades until the year 2000,
when the Ministry of Education released a decision permitting female students to do so.);
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The Syrian government’s reservations to Article 2 was especially
alarming, given its purpose (and CEDAW’s mission) to “condemn dis-
crimination against women in all its forms. . . [and] pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating dis-
crimination against women.”247 In 2007, four years after Syria’s rati-
fication, the Committee issued concern about Syria’s lack of sufficient
female representation in the People’s Assembly, specifically its in-
ability to raise the number of women to thirty percent, with no plan
or intent to move forward.248 The CEDAW Committee highlighted
the visible discrimination towards women in Syria’s Personal Status
Act, Penal Code,249 and Nationality Act (the last of which prohibits
Syrian women from passing their nationality to their children if the
father is not Syrian, but allows Syrian men to pass on nationality to
both a non-Syrian wife and children).250
The first decade of the 2000s, and the first years of Bashar’s
rule, opened small windows for Syrian feminists. Small intellectual
and elitist groups started to come together to publicly highlight
problematic laws related to divorce, honor killings, and the right of
women to pass citizenship on to their children; they also pushed for
a public celebration of International Women’s Day.251 It was under-
stood, however, that any progress would be incremental, limited,
and granted by the mercy of the Ba’athist Party agenda. The regime
was open to the idea of taking some symbolic measures, like in Egypt,
Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations
Relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, 28 (Apr. 10, 2006), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/309
/97/PDF/N0630997.pdf?OpenElement [http://perma.cc/7QLV-7ZLD] (Syria maintained
“reservations to article 2; article 9, paragraph 2, concerning the grant of a woman’s na-
tionality to her children; article 15, paragraph 4, concerning freedom of movement and
of residence and domicile; article 16, paragraph 1 (c), (d), (f) and (g), concerning equal rights
and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution with regard to guardianship,
the right to choose a family name, maintenance and adoption; article 16, paragraph 2,
concerning the legal effect of the betrothal and the marriage of a child, inasmuch as this
provision is incompatible with the provisions of the Islamic Shariah; and article 29,
paragraph 1, concerning arbitration between States in the event of a dispute.”).
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to appease international donors that mandated some changes before
dispersing funding, such as from the United Nations Development
Program.252 That being said, most Syrian feminists did not consider
the changes as revelatory of a regime that sought to welcome genu-
ine political participation by women (and men), who did not promote
the Ba’athist Party platform.253
In 2006, Bashar appointed the Arab world’s first female vice
president, Najah al-Attar, a loyal member of the Ba’athist Party who
had served as the Minister of Culture from 1976 until 2000.254 During
Bashar’s first decade in power, the total number of women in execu-
tive branch positions rose from six percent to nine percent, with
three serving in areas not traditionally held by women (tourism, hous-
ing and construction, as well as environmental affairs); the number of
female ambassadors also rose from 11 percent in 2005 to 15 percent
in 2012.255 And while women’s participation in local and administra-
tive elections was 19 percent in 2007, it dropped severely to 2.6 per-
cent in 2011, which the government cited in its 2012 CEDAW report
as being due to poor conditions for voting in the country.256 Women’s
role in the judiciary was existent but far from robust: in 2012, out
of 1,508 judges, 240 were female (15.9 percent); in 2012, pursuant
to Decree 173, one female was assigned to serve as a member of the
seven member Supreme Constitutional Court.257 Reports detailing
women’s roles in politics reveal that, at all levels of government, these
women were expected to pledge full loyalty to the Ba’athist Party
agenda and could not operate freely or independently.258
Parallel to the Egyptian government’s control and management
of civil society, in Syria such groups were also controlled and man-
aged by the Assad regime and its close associates.259 Both civil society
and the charitable sector, including those focused on women’s rights
and well-being, remained under the direction of state-associated
entities.260 In 2006, Syria’s First Lady, Asma’a al-Assad, launched
Syria Trust for Development, which still today monopolizes the
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PARTICIPATION 18 (2016).
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/20120117222623/http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=79682&d=24
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Damascus-registered NGO sector in Syria.261 Groups like the General
Women’s Union, which continued to receive government support, were
permitted to promote female literacy campaigns, organized voca-
tional trainings, and created nurseries for the children of working
women.262 During this time period, there were also female members
of parliament calling to amend personal status laws, although very
few of them led strategic interventions in the Assembly in order to
do so.263 The Assembly did ultimately pass a limited number of per-
sonal status laws: Article Twenty-Nine in the Personal Status Code
raised the age of custody with the mother to thirteen years of age for
the boy and fifteen years of age for the girl; the Primary Education
Law was amended to mandate obligatory education to the end of
ninth grade for both sexes; and Legislative Decree Thirty-Five in-
creased the duration of maternity leave.264
The Arab Spring arrived to Syria in March 2011. The Syrian
government, which had policed all civil society activities carefully,
doubled down on state control of all activity, and it became clear very
quickly that even non-violent protesters advocating for women’s in-
clusion within the existing political framework would not be wel-
come.265 Ultimately any project centered on “fair representation that
builds upon and carries a democratic, emancipatory and progressive
project that can contribute to the social prosperity” was out of the
question.266 And Syrian women’s rights activists were identified as
pushing for an emancipatory movement that required much more
space that the Ba’athist regime was willing to concede. In 2012, the
constitution was amended, and overall tailored to further consoli-
date Bashar al-Assad’s personal control over the state, as opposed
to placing the emphasis on leadership of the Ba’athist Party.267 As
a result, his amendment of Article 8 of the constitution was done
under the guise of ‘opening’ Syria to more than just Ba’athist Party
instead, it actually empowered Bashar as its absolute ruler.268 The
261. Nick Hopkins & Emma Beals, How Assad Regime Controls UN Aid Intended for
Syria’s Children, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2016/aug/29/how-assad-regime-controls-un-aid-intended-for-syrias-children
[http://perma.cc/DL8C-BP88]. To read more about the challenges of civil society in Syria
and elite internal competition to obtain international donor funding under the guise of
doing work for Syrian women, see ANDREW TABLER, IN THE LION’S DEN 63–70 (2011).
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pre-2012 constitution read: “The leading party in the society and the
state is the Socialist Arab Baath Party. It leads a patriotic and pro-
gressive front seeking to unify the resources of the people’s masses
and place them at the service of the Arab nation’s goals.”269
The 2012 constitution modified Article 8, and produced section
4, a section that was meant to prevent any collection of peoples from
uniting on any shared identities, including that of gender, ethnicity,
or otherwise.270 The regime had made a concerted effort to prevent
any of these groups from organizing for decades so that they could
not pose any significant challenge to it or the Ba’athist Party rule.271
“Carrying out any political activity or forming any political parties
or groupings on the basis of religious, sectarian, tribal, regional,
class-based, professional, or on discrimination based on gender, race
or color may not be undertaken.”272
Eight years of the uprising has changed Syrian society for the
foreseeable future: women have assumed important leadership posi-
tions (both in regime and opposition circles), but they have also been
severely sidelined when it has come to genuine decision-making po-
sitions. The regime touts Buthana Sha’ban as the political and media
advisor to Bashar, as well as Hadiya Abbas as the country’s first
female Speaker of the People’s Assembly.273 In July 2016, the regime
also appointed 3 female ministers out of 32 in Bashar’s cabinet.274
Most recently, in February 2019, the regime signed into law rushed,
limited modifications to the Personal Status Law without consulta-
tions with civil society or women’s organizations, with jurists receiv-
ing leaked versions of the draft laws only a few hours before they
were approved by the People’s Assembly.275 These laws were passed
for two reasons: first, the regime is attempting to appease its own
EAST CTR. (May 8, 2014), https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55541?lang=en [http://perma.cc
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ment Sacked for Poor Performance, BUSINESS STANDARD (July 21, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://
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domestic constituents inside of Syria who are satisfied with such
limited reforms, knowing that the regime is unwilling to do anymore;
second, the regime is seeking to appease western leaders who are
looking for ways to justify Assad’s continued presence over a country
that actually facilitated the proliferation of extremist, terrorist groups
that it later claimed to fight,276 as well as resulted in the displacement
of thirteen million people,277 and led to the death of possibly another
million Syrians.278
Meanwhile, the primary opposition framework, the National Coa-
lition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, has mandated since
its inception that one of its two vice presidents must be a female.279
The High Negotiations Committee, part of the Coalition and the pri-
mary negotiating opposition delegation, includes three women out of
fifteen members.280 Many civil society and political organizations
have been created, with the intent of grooming and preparing a cadre
of female politicians who are equipped and trained to participate as
political representatives.281 There are most definitely a growing num-
ber of women leaders that have emerged in Syria since 2011: many
women led humanitarian and civil society groups, are advocates for
political solutions, and have led protests against armed groups, includ-
ing terrorist groups. But systematic inclusion of women in top-level
decision-making positions remains problematic, and this is nothing
to say of the thousands of local coordinating and administrative
councils inside of Syria since 2011 which have diverse experiences
with women leadership. Women’s representation differed dramati-
cally depending on the culture of geographical areas, as well as the
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personalization of politics. For example, in 2011, fifty percent of the
coastal, liberal city of Latakia’s coordination committee members were
women; meanwhile, in 2014, the birthplace of the revolution and the
more conservative province of Dar’a touted only three women in all of
the province’s 136 local councils.282 Representatives of the councils
cited “social traditions and customs” as the reason for the absence
of women, as well as ties to armed and religious groups that heavily
influenced the local council elections.283
Personalization is another hurdle: a handful of figures who, due
to their public relations, rather than their qualifications or experi-
ence, dominate political positions and decision-making have ulti-
mately diminished local trust in such institutions and their ability
to be true reflections of the democratic aspirations of the population
at every level.284
Despite many setbacks to women’s political participation, inclu-
sion of women in the top echelons of Syrian negotiations has emerged
as a primary goal over the last few years through the UN Office of
the Special Envoy for Syria.285 In early 2014, UN Entity for Gender
and Equality Women supported the establishment of Syrian Women’s
Initiative for Peace and Democracy (SWIPED), that started to gather
and consolidate the efforts of diverse women’s groups and networks,
including well-known entities such as the Syrian Feminist Lobby and
the Syrian Women’s Network.286 A key ask was to include a thirty
percent quota of women on both sides of the negotiating table, which
neither the regime or opposition had implemented (which neither
the regime or the opposition has implemented to this day).287 The
SWIPED lost many of its most active women in short order, how-
ever, because it ultimately aimed to paint the image of women as
peacemakers, instead of serious political actors.288 Former SWIPED
member Dima Moussa stated that they began adding: 
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more women to SWIPED who were closer to the regime, who
would only agree to take up vague political positions and tried
to force all SWIPED members to do the same, ultimately playing
into the stereotype that women were apolitical and able to agree
on everything. Going along with this would not allow the women
to address any critical or controversial issues which were at the
core of the Syria file and necessary in order to reflect that women
were serious political actors as well.289
Efforts to address the 30 percent quota continued however, and
in 2016, under the leadership of UN Special Envoy Staffan de
Mistura, the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board (WAB) was established,
designed to be a “vital laboratory [of] ideas, dialogue and understand-
ing, and access to high-level political negotiations and stakehold-
ers.”290 Its membership included 12 women initially and expanded to
17 women by 2018, and includes both regime and opposition mem-
bers.291 De Mistura also created a Chamber of Civil Society, which
began initially with only one woman member and by 2018 had 42
percent female representation.292 All documents that came out of
negotiations had to go through both entities in order to make sure
that documents were gender sensitive, including pivotal documents
like the Sochi Communique that both regime and opposition delegates
agreed to, and a document that itself enshrines commitment to the
inclusion of 30 percent women in institution and decision-making
structures.293 Like SWIPED, the WAB is outside of the formal nego-
tiating bodies, and its insistence on consensus rather than true politi-
cal efficacy continues to cripple its progress. Further, the creation
of both entities has given Track I negotiators an excuse to justify the
absence of women because it is assumed that women’s opinions
could be solicited via the WAB and Chamber of Civil Society, placing
them outside of the negotiating table itself.294 The creation of these
two entities has also blurred the line between civil society and in-
dependent actors, as the regime had done for years through the
employment of the General Women’s Union, leaving little room for
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genuine political opposition that is meant to serve a separate and
distinct purpose from civil society organizations. This also feeds into
the stereotype that women are better employed as advisors and sup-
porters to the ‘real politicians’ than lead the battles on the negotiat-
ing table, which are dominated by men. Since the committee came
to fruition, neither side has fulfilled the thirty percent quota. However,
the total number of women on 150-member committee is twenty-
nine percent, the most women ever involved in a constitutional
drafting process.295
Despite the two entities’ many flaws, however, the creation of
these two entities is pivotal in the history of conflicts: this was the
first time the UN created such advisory boards for any conflict, and
it has proceeded to follow this model for the Yemen, as a way to ensure
that the voices from both cross-sections of society are included.296
Without these entities, the voice of both would undoubtedly have
remained absent in the negotiations process. Further, the creation of
these entities has further empowered Syrian women to create strong
networks solely focused on grooming a greater number of women for
political activity and negotiation, such as the Syrian Women’s Po-
litical Movement, that too demands thirty percent representation of
women in all levels of political activity related to Syria.297
The above underlines the significant challenges ahead in order
to mandate and enforce the actual involvement of women in the
political negotiations—in the Track I process—which will continue to
be one hindrance (among many) in Syria’s challenge to produce a rep-
resentative democracy. What is even a more tremendous hurdle, as
can be seen from the disheartening story of Syria’s history above, is
that without a system that encourages the emancipation of all Syri-
ans, that considers their diverse input (as both men and women) as
integral to the creation of a democratic state, the opportunities avail-
able for women to partake in substantive political participation will
continue to remain severely limited. Syria’s women are one part of
a greater disenfranchised population. However, without mandated,
295. The names are now public. The current UN Envoy, Geir Pedersen, tried to balance
the lack of full thirty percent women representation on the opposition and regime teams
by adding more women in the civil society group. Overall, the constitutional committee
now has twenty-nine percent women. See id. at 76.
296. The Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group Plays An Active Role During The
Sweden Consultations OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR
YEMEN (Dec. 12, 2018), https://osesgy.unmissions.org/yemeni-women%E2%80%99s-techni-
cal-advisory-group-plays-active-role-during-sweden-consultations [http://perma.cc/B9C6
-32FY] (It created the Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group, comprised of eight
women).
297. Syrian Women PM (@Syria WPM), TWITTER (Jan. 2020), https://twitter.com/syria
wpm?lang=en [http://perma.cc/9h5v-8G23].
596 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:557
meaningful input of women with political awareness able to push
forward a feminist agenda, and without parallel support to ongoing
grassroots programs to help increase society’s awareness for the ne-
cessity of women’s political inclusion, the chances of a lasting, stable,
and just peace in Syria is highly unlikely.
CONCLUSION
Syria and Egypt pose similar conundrums for those trying to
promote meaningful inclusion of women in political life. Both suffer
from a lack of steady flow of women who want and are encouraged
to participate in politics, in a consequential way, at every level. The
factors discussed earlier in this Article hold true in both Syria and
Egypt: women are largely relegated to sectors that are traditionally
female: culture, education, family planning, and the like; very rarely
are they able to hold positions in other sectors, such as security,
transportation, and finance. They are not mobilized enough to push
against laws that discriminate against them, or at times they dis-
couraged entirely by the ruling parties they are affiliated with to do so
in order to maintain the status quo. Sometimes, they do not care to
change those laws either, because they are females but not feminists.
Yet for women who may genuinely want to effectuate real po-
litical change, the political systems in place radically hinder their
independence and ability to operate as political actors: first, the laws,
on their face, discriminate against them, especially in the realm of
Personal Status Laws;298 second, the regimes promote only women
that they see as loyal to their party/government agenda, isolating
any women who want to focus on changing legal-based, yet non-
political areas in the system. This second systematic issue is one that
no doubt impacts both men and women, and this should be under-
scored. But this is why Syria’s case is important, now more than
ever. As in Rwanda, post-conflict scenarios offer a rare opportunity
for radical changes in the system, and Syrian society—and those in
favor of women’s political participation—must be ready to make the
necessary demands in order to be included on the table and not as
advisors in the background. In the event that U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2254 is applied, it requires the political process to be an
“inclusive” one “that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian
people” protects “the rights of all Syrians,” and encourages the
“meaningful participation of women in the UN-facilitated political
process for Syria.”299 But this last clause, which is of most relevance
298. Towards an Engendered Democratic Syrian Constitution, supra note 281.
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here, can take many shapes and forms, and Syrian women need to
be able to ask for the following, among other things: the inclusion of
women at all levels of government (legislative, judiciary, and execu-
tive); electoral laws that will mandate, facilitate, and encourage their
inclusion by political parties; and government that allows space for
independent grassroots organizations that educate both men and
women about the legal and political obstacles that women face and
need addressed in a new political system. There are many reasons
to doubt that meaningful change will come, especially in the event
that current President Bashar al-Assad remains in power. But on
the other hand, the dynamics of politics in Syria, and the ongoing
political process, is constantly influx. And Syrian women, and those
that support their genuine inclusion in a future Syrian government,
must be ready to make their case in the event that when this con-
flict finally comes to an end, a genuine, democratic, and inclusive
government is finally allowed to hold power in Syria.
